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6 Synonyms
7 Mental state attribution; Mindreading; Social
8 cognition
9 Definition
10 The cognitive ability to predict or explain an indi-
11 viduals’ behavior through the attribution of men-
12 tal states.
13 Introduction
14 Comparative cognition researchers have long
15 been interested in the nature of nonhuman animal
16 social capacities. One capacity has received pro-
17 longed attention: mindreading, or “theory of
18 mind” as it also called, is often seen to be the
19 ability to attribute mental states to others in the
20 service of predicting and explaining behavior.
21 This attention is garnered in no small measure
22 from interest into what accounts for the distinctive
23 features of human social cognition and what are
24 the evolutionary origins of those features. This
25entry surveys: (1) main hypotheses concerning
26the adaptive value of mindreading, (2) theoretical
27problems complicating our ability to determine
28whether nonhuman animals mindread, and ﬁnally
29(3) proposals that mindreading is a plural rather
30than unitary cognitive system.
31Social Intelligence Hypothesis
32One intuitive idea is that mindreading evolved in
33response to social pressures. The Social Intelli-
34gence Hypothesis asserts that the ability to reason
35about the intelligent action of group members
36affords greater beneﬁts as social settings become
37more complex (Humphrey 1976; Jolly 1966).
38Certain social groupings seem to require substan-
39tial cognitive control on behalf of group members.
40Individuals must potentially be able to recognize
41and track particular individuals, kin relationships,
42and dominance hierarchies, all of which are sub-
43ject to rapid changes over time. The Social Intel-
44ligence Hypothesis holds that social environments
45are necessary conditions on the development of
46social cognitive skills like mindreading. To sub-
47stantiate this hypothesis, it is important to deter-
48mine whether nonhuman animals that lack the
49complexity of social groupings seen in similar
50species also lack analogous social cognition skills
51(Vonk et al. 2015). For instance orangutans, which
52are relatively solitary in relation to other great
53apes, are sufﬁciently similar with regards to social
54cognitive skills (Herrmann et al. 2007).
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55 Exactly what social cognition skills were
56 selected for is a further question. The ability to
57 reason about others’ behavior in social contexts
58 might be useful in out-competing conspeciﬁcs.
59 Known under the guise of the “Machiavellian
60 hypothesis,” some argue making better predic-
61 tions of others’ future behavior allows for one to
62 manipulate others through various forms of
63 deception (Whiten and Byrne 1988). As individ-
64 uals gain more sophisticated understanding of
65 social action and greater predictive success, com-
66 petition becomes tough, thus creating an evolu-
67 tionary “arms race.” This hypothesis interprets the
68 coalition formation and reconciliation behavior
69 found in many primates in terms of long-term
70 strategic responses, though there may be more
71 mundane reasons, such as tracking food locations
72 that promote this behavior (see Barrett and Henzi
73 2005).
74 An alternative view, one commensurate with
75 Alison Jolly’s initial account, suggests that coop-
76 erative social learning, not competition among
77 conspeciﬁcs, led to the development of sophisti-
78 cated social cognitive skills such a mindreading
79 (Andrews 2012a; Heyes and Frith 2014). Social
80 learning is the transmission of information across
81 group members within a social context. While
82 mindreading ability may not be required to engage
83 in forms of social learning in mimicry and imita-
84 tion, other social cognition skills may be required.
85 For example, imitation might require that agents
86 have (i) a “natural pedagogy” or evolved interpre-
87 tive biases towards demonstrators and (ii) take a
88 teleological stance, i.e., attribute purpose, design,
89 or function, to others (Csibra and Gergely 2005).
90 Some comparative evidence suggests that over-
91 imitation, or the tendency to imitate demonstra-
92 tors’ behaviors in spite of their causal irrelevancy,
93 is a distinctively human strategy facilitating more
94 rapid social learning of instrumental skills and
95 social conventions (Horner and Whiten 2004AU2 ). It
96 has been hypothesized then that our species-
97 speciﬁc proclivity for high ﬁdelity imitation may
98 be linked to “cumulative cultural transmission”:
99 instrumental skills and social conventions are not
100 only inherited across generations – imitated
101 behaviors may be recombined in novel contexts
102and in innovative ways (Legare and Neilsen
1032015).
104The Logical Problem
105It is widely held that reasoning about the inten-
106tional actions of others is a form of causal
107reasoning – we attribute unobservable causal
108determinants of others’ behavior in intentional
109explanations just as we do when we discover
110what makes simple machines function. This
111view receives partial support from developmental
112research on causal reasoning. Alison Gopnik and
113her colleagues introduced young children to boxes
114called “blickets” that would light up or make a
115sound under various parameters, such as when
116some collection of objects and the device were
117in direct contact (Gopnik and Sobel 2000). They
118concluded that not only did children recruit mem-
119ories of prior interactions when being asked to
120predict what would make the blicket work, they
121were sensitive to the potential causal mechanisms
122at work. While in many cases causal reasoning
123requires knowledge of the observable states of
124objects at different times, it sometimes requires
125the positing of intermediate states that are percep-
126tually opaque yet causally relevant in the assess-
127ment of observed events. The perceptually opaque
128causal determinants in the case of mindreading are
129internal mental states – the beliefs and desires or
130perceptions and goals that cause the resultant
131behavior.
132Comparative researchers disagree about the
133causal reasoning abilities of nonhuman animals.
134While Penn and Povinelli (2007) claim that their
135studies suggest that chimpanzees do not share
136proﬁciency at inferring the underlying causal
137structure of phenomena with humans, other
138researchers have found evidence of causal reason-
139ing in great apes on a par with that which we ﬁnd
140in human children. Völter and Call (2014) AU3show
141that apes infer causal structures from the
142coactivation of blicket detectors similarly to
143young children and can recruit this knowledge in
144their interventions.
145Assuming mindreading is analogous to causal
146reasoning in the way hinted above, there is further
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147 disagreement as to whether nonhuman animals’
148 social cognitive abilities call upon unobservable
149 intentional states. While evidence suggests that
150 subordinate chimpanzees know what dominant
151 chimpanzees observe when competing over a
152 food source (Hare et al. 2000), whether their
153 behavioral preferences involve the attribution of
154 mental states is hotly contested. Povinelli and
155 Vonk (2003) take issue with these and similar
156 ﬁndings, on the grounds they are subject to “the
157 logical problem”. Assume we are deciding
158 between two hypotheses regarding a subjects’
159 behavior in a social context. The mindreading
160 hypothesis assumes the subject confers mental
161 states on some conspeciﬁc in the service of pre-
162 dicting their future behavioral states. The compet-
163 ing behavior reading hypothesis assumes she
164 confers only behavioral states. If we are limited
165 to the subjects’ behavior when deciding between
166 these two hypotheses, it seems just as likely that
167 the subject relies on associations between observ-
168 able behaviors in predicting the future states of
169 conspeciﬁcs as it does that they would rely on the
170 unobservable mental states.
171 Exactly what the logical problem means for
172 comparative research and whether it can be solved
173 is up for debate. Tomasello & Tomasello and Call
174 (2006) argue that mindreading hypotheses pro-
175 vide the best explanation since they unify a
176 range of very different experiments already dem-
177 onstrated. Others, while not so sanguine, are
178 hopeful that a novel experimental design could
179 solve the problem (e.g., Lurz 2012; Heyes 2015;
180 Sober 2015, and Bugnyar et al. 2016). Halina
181 (2015)AU4 argues that the logical problem is not a
182 unique theoretical dilemma for comparative
183 researchers, so there is no special epistemic bur-
184 den with regards to disproving competing behav-
185 ior reading hypotheses. Andrews (2012b)
186 similarly suggests that the logical problem is an
187 ancillary of the philosophical problem of other
188 minds: what justiﬁes my attributions of mental
189 states to others, given that my access to their
190 mental life is always mediated through their
191 behavior? Buckner (2014) evinces that in order
192 to solve the logical problem, there must be a
193 unique causal role for the contents of an agent’s
194 mental states to play in determining their action.
195But which interpretations of the content of inter-
196nal mental states are causally efﬁcacious, and how
197so? Because any observable behavior is compati-
198ble with a potentially inﬁnite set of mental atti-
199tudes, accurate attribution that would facilitate
200causal reasoning about observable actions of
201others appears to be computationally intractable
202(Zadwizki 2014).
203Multiple Systems Hypothesis
204Just as one might distinguish between an agent’s
205explicit, reﬂective, deliberate knowledge from
206their implicit, heuristic-based, automatic knowl-
207edge of the causal structure of some physical
208system, we might discover multiple processing
209systems for mindreading. Children can correctly
210verbally identify and track false beliefs at around
2114 years of age. Even though some nonhuman
212animals consider others’ perceptual perspectives,
213this ability is not on par with children’s ability to
214verbally reason about others’ beliefs. That said,
215testing false belief responsiveness by measuring
216preferential looking times has some now thinking
217that preverbal infants have mindreading skills as
218well (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005). Infants’ sur-
219prising performance in social contexts means
220could help make sense of the ontogeny and phy-
221logeny of social cognition. Some conjecture that
222mindreading is not a unitary process, but rather
223can be decomposed into unique social cognition
224skills that have divergent evolutionary and devel-
225opmental trajectories.
226Partial evidence for these views comes from
227variations in reaction times in belief attribution.
228By comparing performance across species and
229developmental stages, researchers aim to identify
230“signature limits” which reveal the contours of
231mindreading abilities (Butterﬁll and Apperly
2322013). Signature limits indicate restrictions on
233the performance of some relevant tasks and can
234help to illuminate the mechanisms involved in
235performing the task. For example, while we
236require additional processing to report on some-
237one’s belief; it takes longer to answer questions
238about a person’s belief than it does to answer
239factual questions about the situation (Back and
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240 Apperly 2010). Perspectival information is differ-
241 ent; perceptual information about others’ point of
242 view are automatically processed by subjects
243 (Samson et al. 2010). These studies suggest that
244 adults’ judgments about the number of objects
245 they could see in a visual scene were slower and
246 more error-prone when the scene contained an
247 irrelevant agent whose visual perspective was dif-
248 ferent, suggesting that another perspective can
249 caused an indicative interference effect.
250 If mindreading was not a unitary cognitive
251 system in humans, then nonhuman animal social
252 skills may mirror some aspects of human capaci-
253 ties and not others. Still there are other ways of
254 interpreting limitations on subjects’ performance
255 that do not necessitate the ascription of multiple
256 processes. Subjects’ performance limitations
257 could be the result of limitations on domain gen-
258 eral capacities such as working memory
259 (Carruthers 2016) or infants’ preferential looking
260 times may be the result of implicit memory of the
261 visual contact between the agent and the objects
262 and experience with this sort of behavior (Perner
263 forthcoming).
264 Conclusion
265 Investigations into the social cognition skills of
266 nonhuman animals has proﬁted from the pro-
267 longed interaction between researchers in devel-
268 opmental psychology, neuroscience, ecology,
269 anthropology, and philosophy. Above we focus
270 on the development of research with regards to
271 mindreading or the ability to reason about others’
272 mental states in the service of predicting and
273 explaining their behavior. Importantly we see the
274 question of what is the nature of mindreading and
275 what is its adaptive value occur in a parallel,
276 piecemeal fashion.
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